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NOTES.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-SUFFICIENCY AND CERTAINTY
OF INFORMATION IN LANGUAGE OF STATUTE.-A statute of the state

of Utah (Sess. Laws, 1911, c. xo8) provides that "any person who

shall by promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme,
cause, induce, persuade, encourage, inveigle or entice an inmate of
a house of prostitution or place of assignation to remain therein as
such inmate" is guilty of the crime of pandering. An information
based upon this statute charged that the defendant "did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by promises and threats
and by divers devices and schemes, cause, induce, persuade and
encourage" a certain named female, "being then and there an inmate of a certain" designated "house of prostitution to remain
therein as such inmate." The defendant, being convicted, appealed
assigning for error the overruling of a demurrer to the information
and a motion in arrest of judgment. The appellate court held
that the information was insufficient and uncertain because it did
not iet forth the facts and circumstances constituting the promises
(721)

722

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

and threats, devices and sclemes by which the female was induced
to remain an inmate.' It is the purpose of this note to discuss the
law underlying this decision.
There are numerous reasons for the rule requiring particularity
in the charges of an indictment, and whether or not the indictment
particularizes sufficiently to answer the purposes enumerated is the
test of its sufficiency. Without setting forth the various reasons
given by the text writers2 and the cases3 it is submitted that an
indictment which gives such notice to the defendant that he is
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
and may prepare his defense thereto both in respect to the law
and the facts is sufficient to serve all the other purposes for which
the charging part is designed. Thus an indictment fulfilling this
requirement, surely identifies the charge to such an extent that the
record of conviction or acquittal may be pleaded in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense, and to give the judge such information that he may apply the law correctly. Therefore, the test of
the sufficiency of the charging part of an indictment is whether it
gives the defendant such notice that he may prepare his defense.
This test applies alike to common law and to statutory offenses.
Standard forms of indictment for common law offenses have been
formulated which comply with the requirement above stated: Such
forms developed contemporaneously with the offenses themselves,
but when the legislature makes criminal an act heretofore not
penal, the first indictment drawn under the act has no precedent.
Many penal acts so specify the acts which are made criminal
that an indictment following the words of the statute and setting out
that the defendant did the prohibited acts at a certain time and
place is sufficient to give the defendant the requisite notice. 4 Other
criminal statutes use words of a general and comprehensive meaning or words with a peculiar legal significance, in which case an
indictment following the exact words of the statute fails in the
above requirement. 5
A statute may penalize the doing of any one of a number
of acts of a similar nature looking toward the same illegal end. There
is but little difference of opinion in one particular in regard to the
sufficiency and certainty of indictments under such acts. The cases
hold that it is proper to charge the doing of any number of the
prohibited acts in a single count, since the doing of any one, any
number or all of the prohibited acts constitutes but a single offense.
1 State v. Topham, 123 Pac. Rep. 888 (Utah, 1912).
2Joyce on Indictments, Sec. 242.
'Wingard v. State, 13 Ga. 396 (1853).
"Holman v. State go S. W. Rep. i74 (Tex. I9o5) ; State v. Holedger, 15
Wash. 443 (1896); State v. Beebe, 53 So. Rep. 730 (La. igio), but see
People v. Perales, 141 Cal. 581 (I9o4)..
"United States v. Cruickshank, 92 W. S. 542 (1875) ; Young v. State, 6o
S. W. Rep. 767 (Tex. i9oI); Bickel v. State, 32 Ind. App. 656 (i9o3).

NOTES
The pleader must be careful, however, to charge the acts conjunctively. Thus it is proper to charge that the defendant did sell,
barter, give away, and otherwise furnish intooicating liquors;6
whereas it would be held to be duplicitous, uncertain and vague
to charge that the defendant did sell, barter, give away or otherwise
Now under the first charge, the defurnish intoxicating liquors
fendant could be convicted upon proof that he did any one of the
acts charged,8 nor would he know until the trial which one the state
would attempt to prove against him. It is therefore difficult to see
that the indictment -which charged the acts disjunctively gives the
defendant any less notice than the one which charged him conjunctively, but such is the law. If it is not permissible to state
such charges disjunctively, the mistake should be taken to be one
merely of form to be cured by amendment at any time. The principal case states the charges conjunctively and so is not to be attacked
on those grounds.
If the decision in the principal case is proper it is to be sustained
on the grounds that the statute uses words and phrases of a general
and comprehensive meaning and of a peculiar legal significance.
A brief analysis of the cases would seem to support the decision,
although the case is on the border line. In United States vs. Hess
the devising of any "artifice or scheme to defraud" through the use
of the mails was prohibited by statute, and it was held that the
device or scheme should be set out in detail in the indictment. It
would follow that the scheme to induce this inmate to remain should
have been set out. There was, however, another element in
United States vs. Hess', namely, that it was a scheme "to defraud,"
and it is a general rule that where fraud is an essential element in the
offense, the facts and circumstances constituting the fraud must be
set out,1 the reason being that fraud in law has a precise significance
somewhat different from fraud in common understanding. There
is no allegation of fraud in the information under discussion, nor
in the statute under which the information was drawn, but we do
find the words "threats" and "promises." Now in legal contemplation, these words "promises" and "threats" have a slightly different
meaning from their ordinary significance. To come within the
reach of the law promises and threats must be such as would be
reasonably calculated to effectuate the desired purpose. In ordinary
language, a promise is a promise, and a threat a threat whether an
ordinary person would act thereon or not. In the last analysis
'Hayes v. State, iii Pac. Rep. Io2o (Okla. ip9o) ; Regardanz v. State,
86 N. E. Rep. 449 (Ind. 19o8) ; State v. Schleuter, Iio Mo. App. 7 (1904).
'Thompson v. State, 37 Ark. 4o8 (1881); but see U. S. v. D. L. & W. R.

R. 152 Fed. 269 (igo7).

'State v. Holedger, i5 Wash. 443 (I8g6).
9,t24
U. S. 483 (I8M).
"State v. Farmer, 1o4 N. C. 887 (1889) ; People v, Klippel, s6o N. Y.
371 (1899).
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the correctness of the decision depends on whether the legislature
intended to restrict these words to their legal significance,
or to
apply them in their ordinary meaning. Since the statute in
question
is a highly penal statute under which the judge might sentence
to
twenty years imprisonment, it would seem that the words
should
be restricted to their legal significance, and, the case is therefore
correct.
L.P.S.
JUDGMENTS BY CONFESSION-WHEN A POWER
OF ATTORNEY TO

CONFESS JUDGMENT IS

Functus Officio.-In Borough of Bellevue vs.

Hallett,' the grantee of a power of attorney to confess judgment
proceeded to have judgment entered. He filed a statement
of claim
but neglected to file a formal confession of judgment. For
this
reason the judgment was subsequently stricken off upon
motion.
A second judgment was then filed, regular in every particular.
But
upon a motion to strike off, this judgment was also nullified
on
the ground that the entry of the first judgment, despite its irregularity, was an exhaustion of the power of attorney: " .
.
this
court, after argument and due consideration, made absolute
the rule
to strike off the first judgment. . . .
True, this was done because of irregularities appearing on the face of the record;
but
the power authorized by the warrant had nevertheless been
exhausted. We cannot breathe into it the breath of life, in
view of
the unbroken line of decisions sustaining this construction
On appeal the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in a short
per
curiam opinion, affirmed the rules of the trial court.
The courts are unanimously of opinion that after a valid judgment has been confessed under a power of attorney, the power
•functus officio. Accordingly where judgment has been entered is
in
one state under a power of attorney, it cannot subsequently
be
entered in another state on the same warrant.2 Even "if
the warrant had been to confess a judgment or judgments, in the
plural,
it seems that a second judgment could not be entered until
the first
judgment had been reversed or set aside." And in a number
of
Pennsylvania cases it has been determined that after a warrant
has
been exercised by a confession of judgment in one county,
a subsequent judgment cannot be entered under the same power in
another
3
county. Similarly it was held in Campbell vs. Canon I that
where
a year and a day was allowed to elapse without execution
upon
a judgment by confession, a second judgment could not be
entered
183 At. Rep. (Penna. 1912).
2
Manufacturers and Mechanics' Bank v. Cowden et al., 3 Hill (N. Y.)
461 (1842).
3Livezly v. Pennock, z Browne 321 (1813); Ely

Karmany, 23 Pa. 3r4
(1854); Ulrich v. Voneida, I P. and W. 245 (1830); v.Martin
v. Rex, 6 Sergeant and Rawle 296 (182o); Neff v. Barr, 14 S. and R. 166 (1826).
'Addison

(Pa.) 267 (1795).

NOTES

tinder the same power of attorney, even though the first judgment
could be revived by a scire facias. The "warrant of attorney
authorized the entry of only one judgment, and was satisfied by
the entry of the first judgment." Likewise after judgment has
been recovered before a justice of the peace on a judgment. note,
the warrant of attorney therein is functus officio, and no judgment
can be entered thereon in the common pleas. 5 And obviously,
where a judgment in one county is but a transcript of the record
of a judgment by confession in another, the two judgments fall
together when the original judgment is stricken off. 6
On the other hand it has been held in a Delaware case 7 that
an attempt to enter judgment under a warrant of attorney in the
name of the obligee in a bond several terms of court after his death,
was so utterly inconsistent with the power conferred that it must
be considered "a total failure to execute the warrant, and an absolute
nullity in the contemplation of law." Accordingly a subsequent
judgment, entered in the name of the obligee's administrator, was
allowed to stand. And there can be no doubt that where an entry
of judgment is absolutely void, it has not exhausted the power of
attorney authorizing it.
The cases which cannot be so readily justified have arisen where
the power of attorney was irregularly exercised and therefore voidable as against the grantor of the power. Can a second judgment
be entered under the same power after the first judgment has been
set aside? The Pennsylvania courts have answered this question
negatively. In Osterhout vs. Briggs 8 it was held that where judgment on a judgment note is irregular because of its* premature
entry, the power of attorney is nevertheless functus officio. A
second judgment, regularly entered, will therefore be stricken off
together with the premature judgment. The first judgment "it is
true was irregular and voidable at the instance of the defendant
only, but it was not absolutely void, and as against parties other
than the defendants, it was not -even voidable." And in Philadelphia vs. Johnson 9, in which similar facts were before the court,
Judge Smith of the Superior Court said: "A power exists in law
only for some purpose, and when fully executed by the accomplishment of its purpose it is exhausted. The authority given by it ends
when nothing remains to be done in pursuance of it. It may even
be exhausted without being executed, when its purpose has been
otherwise accomplished." And again: "It was not a case of an
imperfect execution of the power, but of a perfect execution, with its
"Dixon v.Miller, 20 Pa. C. C. 335 (1897).
'Banning v. Taylor, 24 Pa. 297 (1855).
'Guyer's Administrator v. Guyer, 6 Houst. 431 (i88o). Accord: Kellerman v. Kerst, Phila. C. P. No. 2, Dec. T. ,goo, 634, unreported.
'37 Sup. Ct. 169 (i9o8).
'23

Sup. Ct. 591 (19o3), affirmed per curiam in 208 Pa. 645 (1904).
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effect liable to be defeated through matters not entering into the
act of execution." 30
Whether or not the argument in these cases, and the conclusion
which it compels, are sound, depends entirely upon the nature and
purpose of a power of attorney to confess judgment. If by giving
such a power, the grantor merely endows his attorney with the privilege of perfunctorily executing certain formalities, there can be no
difference of opinion with reference to the court's conclusion that,
once the formalities have been accomplished, however barren of result, the power has been exhausted. Moreover, if this is the true purpose of a power of attorney to confess judgment, there can be no
distinction between a void execution, and an execution merely voidable. For in both instances the outward forms have been executed.
But it is difficult to believe that ihe parties to a warrant of attorney
ever regard it as no more than a grant of the right to execute certain formal technicalities. It is submitted that the grantor of a
power of attorney to confess judgment intends to enable his grantee
to avail himself of a substantial, not merely a formal, remedy
against him without a court trial. That being true, how can the
power be said to be functus officio until a judgment of full validity
has been entered against the grantor of the power? Accepting Judge
Smith's statement that "The authority given by it ends when nothing
remains to be done in pursuance of it," can it be said that nothing
remains to be done until a judgment, regular in every particular, has been entered? Indeed it would seem that the reasoning in the Pennsylvania cases cited cannot be sustained if judgments
by confession are not to be deemed wholly artificial in the eyes
of the law. Certainly form and substance are not given the relative
importance which modern legal thought accords them.
What has been said applies in cases where the first judgment
is voidable as against the defendant only, as in Osterhout vs. Briggs
and Philadelphia vs. Johnson, supra. But its force is even more
patent in the principal case where the judgment was wholly irregular as well against third parties as against the grantor of the
power."1
See also Commonwealth v. Massi, 225 Pa. 548 (19o9) in which Philadelphia v. Johnson, supra, and Osterhout v. Briggs, supra, are re-affirmed in
an opinion by Mr. Justice Potter.
I That this is probably the law seems a reasonable deduction from the
cases. Weaver v. McDevitt, 21 Sup.'Ct. 597 (1902) presents the necessity of
having a formal confession on the record.

See also Lytle v. Colts,

27

Pa.

z93 (1856). In Summy v. Hiestand, 65 Pa. 30o (i87o) Judge Sharswood
points out that the mere failure to enter a judgment on the record "May
perhaps endanger the lien of it as to third persons; but as between the
parties there is a valid final judgment of record." But in the principal case,
the Supreme Court apparently aproved the lower court's action in striking
off the judgment at the instance of the defendant for the reason that the
formal confession had not been entered .up. Hence failure to enter the
judgment would appear to stamp it as irregular as against all parties concerned.

NOTES

The view taken in this note is substantiated by the Supreme
Court of Iowa in Huner vs. Doolittle.12 The reversal of the first
decree, it was held, "placed the case and the rights of the parties
the same as if the first decree had not been rendered. The intention
of the power had not been carried out, consequently the object was
not accomplished, and the authority was not exhausted by the first
act." And a similar opinion was intimated by Judge Washington,
sitting in the United States Circuit Court, in Fairchild vs. Camac. 1 3
Much may be said against the desirability of permitting judgments by confession to be entered under powers of attorney in any
case. Indeed in England today the practice of taking judgment
in this way is almost obsolete. 14 But where the practice still prevails, there is scant justification for a rule of law which permits the
intention of the parties to be defeated by a barren technicality.

W.A.S.
LEGAL ETHIcs.-The following questions were recently answered
by the New York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Legal
Ethics :

I. QUESTION:

Is it proper professional conduct for attorneys to solicit employment by
the use of literature such as that annexed hereto?
"Dear Sir:
We submit to you herewith a form Retainer setting forth the plan
under which we are employed as attorneys and general counsel by many
large and small firms and corporations.
We would appreciate the privilege of an appointment with you at your
office or ours, to explain the moderate terms and the advantages of this
arrangement.
Yours very truly,
RETAINER.
Dear Sirs:

We hereby retain you as our attorneys and general counsel in New
York City in connection with any and all legal matters which we may refer
to you, for the term of years from the date hereof, at an annual compensation for all legal services hereunder of
dollars ($
), payable in equal quarterly installments at the end
of each quarter-year.
We understand that within the term hereof we are to have the right
to call upon you for all legal services of every kind and nature in and
about our regular business, including all matters of litigation and negotiation,
and we are to have the privilege of consultation and advice at all reasonable
times.
"3 Greene 76 (851).
."8 Fed. Cas. No. 46IO; 3 Wash. C. C. 558 (i8ig).
14 18 Halsbury's "The Laws of England," i9o.
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In the event that any member or representative of your firm is required to leave New York City in connection with our legal business, we
agree to pay you additional compensation for such service at the rate of
dollars ($
) per day for each day or part
of a day so actually and necessarily spent outside said city.
After the expiration of the term herein limited, the arrangement
herein set forth shall continue until terminated upon thirty days written
notice by either party to the other.
This retainer shall take effect upon your acceptance hereof in writing.
Yours respectfully,
.,By
...........................
NOTF.--,We do not desire to displace by our proposition any existing,
satisfactory relation."
ANSWER:
RESOLVED that this method of solicitation of employment by members
of the Bar is unworthy, does not conform to the ethical standards of our
profession, and should be condemned.

IL QUESTION:
A v. X. A's claim is undoubtedly dishonest, but serious difficulties
will be encountered by X in his defense. Y has knowledge of certain
material facts and is also in possession of certain documentary evidence
which, without the slightest difficulty--by simply affixing or withholding his
signature-could be used to aid A or to strengthen X's defense. Y is evidently a person not affected by conscientious scruples as to the sanctity of
an oath. He has a claim of $ ........ against S, a person closely related to
A, and has made an 6ffer to B, defendant's attorney, to withhold his signature from said papers and to testify for the defendant if his claim against
S is fully paid by X. B refuses to dicker with Y and tells Y that he will
have none of his offers. B feels that he is perfectly right in the matter,
deeming the acceptance of such an offer absolutely and unqualifiedly unethical, immoral and dishonest.
So far, so good. But, now, what about X and his interests? Is it
B's duty to divulge to him the foregoing facts, he being ignorant thereof
at this time? And, if X upon learning these facts, should decide that
his interests would best be served by accepting Y's offer, what attitude
should B assume? Under no circumstances will B make a deal with Y,
with or without instructions from X. Then, should B withdraw from the
case if X does not agree with him as to the moral turpitude involved in
making a deal with Y?
Further, Y being willing to aid A upon the same terms, should that,
fact have any weight? Would X be justified, under these circumstances, B,
refusing to dicker with Y, in bowing to the inevitable and committing an
obviously immoral act, although probably necessary to an otherwise absolutely honest defense?
Lastly, if your Committee is of the opinion that the foregoing matter
should be brought to X's attention by B; and X should accept Y's offer
against B's wishes, would not B be justified in refusing further to conduct
X's defense? B feels that he should not wink at such obviously nefarious
and immoral conduct on Y's part and on X's possibly favorable attitude towards Y's offer. Is not B right?
Kindly treat this matter as though it were impossible to obtain evidence of the numerous crimes involved.

NOTES
ANSWER:

RESOLVED that neither the interests nor instructions of clients justify
their lawyers in countenancing or utilizing corrupt practices. A lawyer is
under no duty to submit to his client for his decision a proposition in fraud
of justice. A mere difference of view between lawyer and client does not
require the lawyer to withdraw. Under the circumstances suggested, the
lawyer should not assist his client to avail himself of the corrupt activities
of another. If so instructed by a client who will not be persuaded in the
opinion of the Committee he is justified in withdrawing from the cause.
As to the correctness of the comhnittee's answers to the questions put, there can be no doubt. It has always been considered
unprofessional to solicit practice in the manner indicated in the first
question; and the committee's answer to the second problem is in
accord with the views of no less an authority on legal ethics than
judge Sharswood: I "Counsel . . . ought to refuse to act
under instructions from a client to defeat what he believes to be
an honest and just claim, by insisting upon the slips of the opposite

party, by sharp practice, or special pleading, in short, by any other
means than a fair trial on the merits in open court. There is no
professional duty, no virtual engagement with the client, which compels an advocate to resort to such measures, to secure success in any
cause, just or unjust; and when so instructed, if he believes it to be
intended to gain an unrighteous object, he ought to throw up the
cause, and retire from all connection with it, rather than thus be a
W. A. S.
participator in other men's sins."

"Legal Ethics," p. 42.

